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This paper proposes a model on the moderating role of board equity ownership 
on the relationship between corporate governance and performance of banks 
during apost banking crisis era that necessitated a bailout reform. The corporate 
governance characteristicsin this study were appropriately selected specifically 
based on the Nigerian banking sector’s corporate governance problems. This 
paperalso addresses the board’s functions of resources provision as established 
by resource dependence theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Governance (hereafter called CG) had been regarded as one of the basic 
fundamental determinants of the performance of a corporate organisation. Poor CG had 
been severally cited as the major cause of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the CG 
scandals in USA, and Europe that turns out to be a global phenomenon (de Villiers, 
Naiker, & van Staden, 2011; Kao, Hodgkinson, & Jafar, 2008).CG was not as an important 
issue in many countries until the advent of a series of   corporate scandals such as Enron 
and WorldCom in the US and Parmalat in Europe.Nigeria as a developing nation was 
greatly hit by sporadic collapse of various financial institutions especially the banking 
sector. Banking sector becomes the most regulated sector in the economy in order to 
sustain the confidence of depositors, enhance efficiency, ensure the continued soundness 
of the system itself and thereby minimizing the risk of bank failures (Oluranti, 1991). In the 
Nigerian financial sector, poor managerial performance and poor CG had been identified 
as the major factors causing almost all known cases of a financial institution’s distress in 
the country. These two also necessitated the introduction of consolidation reform in 2004 
(Soludo, 2004)and yet re-emerged afterwards, and led to another reform that brought a 
rescue program termed “bail-out” reform in late 2009. The reform necessitated the bail-out 
by injecting N620 billion naira into ten (10) banks which nearly collapsed due to high non-
performing loans, poor CG, bad liquidity and risk management (CBN, 2010; NDIC, 2011; 
Sanusi, 2010). Consequently, the bail-out reform generated a lot of panic and doubt 
concerning the status of the investments of these banks’ depositors, shareholders and 
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other Nigerians consequently, led to a sparked interest in examining the potential outcome 
of this reform through researches. 
 
The relationship between CG and firm performance is important in ensuring efficient 
corporate control through the monitoring or advisory, counselling roles of Board of 
Directors (hereafter called BODs) who are regarded as the instrument of corporate control 
(Clifford & Evans, 1997). Majority of prior literature mostly focuses on the CG practices in 
the developed western countries like US, UK, Germany, Australia and others etc. (e.g., 
Albring, Robinson, & Robinson, 2013; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; de Villiers et al., 2011; 
Guest, 2008; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Zahra, 1996 etc.). While few studies are conducted in 
developing nations like Nigeria with a particular emphasis on examining the resultant 
effect of CG on firm performance in a post reform era.Therefore, this paperaims at 
proposing a framework in Nigerian context that could examine the potential relevance of 
board equity ownership (BEO) in influencing the relationship between CG and the 
performance of these bail-out banks. This study is therefore proposing a framework that 
focuses on the board resources provision variables (board size, andfemale membership in 
a board) that best address the banks’ CG problems peculiar to Nigeria, and introducing a 
moderating variable (BEO) that will strengthen the inconsistent conflicting results on the 
relationship between CG and banks performance indirectly, as opined byHillman and 
Dalziel (2003), Zahra and Pearce(1989). This framework, unique as it is, aims at covering 
only the bailed-out banks with a total of 2,811 branches in Nigeria using a primary source 
of data (i.e. questionnaire).  
 
There is paucity of studies that use BEO as moderating variable that captures 
board’sresource provision role which addresses the Nigerian bail-out banks, hence the 
need to be introduced into these inconclusive mixed results.The outcome of this paper 
shall be of immense importance tothe academia by addition to literature, regulators, 
shareholders, and other Nigerians as it will reveal the contribution of BEO in strengthening 
BODs’ functions in ensuring good banks’ performance.  The paper is subdivided into 5 
sections from 1.introduction, 2.literature review, 3. BEO (moderator), 4. Bank performance, 
framework, conclusion, 5. Reference. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview of the Nigerian Banking Sector Crisis and Reforms 
Historically, the banking system in Nigeria has experienced so many major challenges 
since after commencement in 1892. Banking crisis is dated back to the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, 1962 which were mostly attributable to lack of proper regulations, followed by 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986, financial liberalisation in 1987-1988 and 
prudential guidelines in 1991 (Beck, Cull, & Jerome, 2005; Oluranti, 1991). Additionally, 
between 1990 and 2004, Central Bank of Nigeria (hereafter called CBN) as bank 
regulators, mandated all banks to increase their required minimum share capital about five 
(5) times, in 1991, 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2005. Yet, all these measures had failed to 
curtail the series of bank distress and failures within the 1990s and beyond(Aburime, 
2008). Lastly came the consolidation reform in 2005 and then the recent bail-out reform in 
2009.Apparently, consolidation reform occurred when CG standards were ineffective. 
Factually, CG failure was among the key factors that contributed to the financial 
institutions’ crisis (CBN, 2006; SEC, 2003). Consolidation brought stronger banks but 
failed to address the necessary faults in CG of most of these banks.  
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Recently, due to a major hit by the global financial crisis, another set of banking sector 
rescue program “Bail-out” was inevitably being introduced to ensure stability and prevent 
distress. After a joint special examination of all the 24 banks in Nigeria by CBN and the 
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereafter called NDIC) in July 2009, significant 
poor CG practices, poorliquidity andcapital adequacy, poor risk management practices 
were found to give birth to excessively high level of non-performing loans in the banks. 
The Governor of CBN Mal. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, declared ten (10) banks as being 
distressed and a bail-out of about N620 billion was injected to rescue them, and then the 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs/MDs) and the board of directors of eight (8) banks were 
immediately removed and then replaced with new ones. These CEOs were then detained, 
prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and also tried 
before the high court for outright stealing, corruption and mismanagement of their banks 
(CBN, 2010; NDIC, 2011; Sanusi, 2010). The CBN has also appointed advisory 
companies like Deutsche Bank, Chapel Hill Denham, KPMG Professional Services and 
Akintola Williams Deloitte etc. to work with the new boards and management of these 
banks by exploring all options for securing their stability and long-term future growth. Even 
though some of these banks had been acquired by other banks, up till now their 




Since after the global financial crisis that touchedmany nations, the mid 2000s saw a 
renewed academic interest in the field of CG and firm performance.CG has been viewed 
from different perspectives by different authors and practitioners based on certain reasons. 
In simple terms, CG is the system by which organizations are directed and controlledin 
order to enhance the strategic values, corporate performance and accountability, for the 
interest of shareholders and other stakeholders.However, most researches conducted 
globally and Nigeria in particular, are observed to have some kind of limitationsthatusually 
results in mixed or conflicting resultssuch as, inconsistent operationalization of board 
variables, limited scope, and convenience samples, and usual focus mainly on the direct 
relationships between board variables and firm’s performance, thus ignoring the indirect 
path through roles and strategic initiatives (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Studies in the Nigerian context which adopts a moderating variable that captures 
board resource provision role are very rare, hence the need to be introduced into these 
inconclusive relations/findings. Also, most of the studies on CG in Nigerian context are 
either conducted before the banks’ bail-out, or not in the area of bail-out reform or not 
covering the banking sector such as Adekoya (2011), Okereke, Abu, and Anyanwu (2011), 
Onakoya, Ofoegbu, and Fasanya (2012), Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012). Only few studies 
were found on bail-out such as Kuye, Ogundele, and Otike-Obaro(2013), Nworji (2011), 
Oghojafor, Olayemi, Okonjia, and Okolie(2010), which all have certain kind of 
shortcomings, small sample, addressing policy issue not the banks’ performance etc. 
Studies on CG covering both financial and non-financial performance are very rare in 
Nigeria except Ogbechie, Koufopoulos, and Argyropoulou (2009). Finally, in terms of 
theory, there had been mix-up or misapplication of theories that should underpin the 
diverse CG variables leading to vague findings (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
 
In this paper, board size and female membership in a board are classified under the 
resource dependence theory perspective where “board size is the total number of board 
members in a board while number of females in a board is the other”. Again, independent 
directors and directors who own shares will be more likely to guide and advice rigorously 
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(Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).This study 
therefore, propose two board variables and develop hypotheses in this paper which reflect 
directors’ resource provision role (driven by resource dependence theory).Additionally, 
these variables were actually selected based on their prominent importance in solving the 
practical problem of CG in Nigerian banks as mentioned in Sanusi (2010). 
 
BODs’ Resource Provision Role (Resource Dependence theory based) 
This study adopts resource dependence perspective as in the framework as in Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) de Villiers et al., (2011), Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000), Hillman 
and Dalziel (2003), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) which opined that boards have the 
functions of facilitating access to vital resources because accessibility to resources is a 
serious problem for firms. A resource rich directors could be actively involved and certainly 
influence business strategy and programs. Resource provision role emanatesfrom the 
resource dependence theory, through a seminal work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). They 
explained the various resources which a director can provide to aid a firm were identified, 
comprising advice, guide and/or counsel, legitimacy, creating information networks 
between the firm and externals members, in addition to privileged linkage to various 
external resources. All this constitute the vital resources that brings a sound performance 
to a company if directors effectively utilize these in delivering this role.  
 
Also, Hillman et al., (2000), categorized outside BODs according to resource dependence 
theory by suggesting their classification as “business experts,” “support specialists,” and 
“community influentials,” signifying the diverse kinds of resources BODS could bring to its 
board. Extant studies had offered results that confirms these roles such as de Villiers et 
al., (2011), Hillman and Dalziel (2003), and Zahra and Pearce (1989). In support of this, 
Kor and Misangyi(2008)contend that BODs having special professional experience may 
perhaps complement the inexperience of CEOs of new enterprises in making strategic 
investments/production. This kind of expertise expedites contact to essential information 
as well as business resources linkages and collaborations (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Zahra 
and Pearce(1989) opined that, under this role, BODs could review strategic opportunities 
through recommending new business innovative ideas. Therefore, this study identify board 
size and female membership in a board, as CG characteristics that are linked to the 
diverse important resources obtainable from the BODs of the bailed-out banks. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has been conducted using these selected 
variables together in a single framework on the Nigerian bail-out banks. Therefore, these 
board characteristics are proposed to examine their indirect effect on banks’ performance 
with the influence of a moderator (board equity ownership) due to the inconclusive, 
conflicting findings on the relationship of these variables to firm performance as suggested 
by Baron and Kenny (1986) on mixed inconclusive results. Also, since boards’ ownership 
is found to be related to firm performance, then it can moderate CG to performance. 
 
Banks Performance 
Organisational performance is an important concept that relates to the way and manner in 
which financial, material and human resources available to an organization are judiciously 
used to achieve the overall corporate objective of an organisation. Various measurement 
models were previously developed to take care of either managerial or organisational or 
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both performance. However, among them all this study adopts the Balance Scorecard 
(BSC) performance model which was developed by Kaplan and Norton (1996). Balance 
Scorecard model provides an excellent system for performance measurement in the 
commercial banking industry Bremser and Chung (2005).  The BSC is the major element 
of a strategic management system that enables organizations to translate strategic goals 
into measures of performance. The measures consist both financial and non-financial 
measures which serves as indicators used in monitoring strategy implementation 
throughout the organization and whether strategic goals are being achieved or not 
(Bremser & Chung, 2005).The framework comprises of four (1 financial, and 3 non-





Board Size (BS) and Banks’ Performance 
As explained by the resource dependence theorist, the total number of directors within a 
firm’s boardroom significantly influences its effectiveness. Despite uniform regulation on 
CG, up to date, there are contradictory notions about the proper or optimal size of BOD in 
a firm. The CBN Code of CG for Nigerian Post-consolidated banks (2006), No.5.3.5 
however provided that “the number of non-executive directors should be more than that of 
executive directors subject to a maximum board size of 20 directors” (CBN, 2006, p.10). 
Here, it could be deduced that no specific figure is legally stated as the optimal size, and 
such allowing the shareholders/board to determine it. However, if a board size (BS) is too 
large, directors may be individually constrained in actively participating in board decisions, 
create an ideological conflict hence, lead to trivial contribution. Also, if a board size is too 
small, the directors may not be able bit the time and effectively deliver their functions. Due 
to the Sanusi(2010)report that BODs fail to make meaningful contribution in their 
boardrooms, this study will therefore seek to examine the relative effect of the diverse 
sizes of the banks’ boards on their banks performance. In an attempt to determine the 
effect of BS on the performance of a firm, several conflicting results were reported. 
 
The theoretical link amongst these different activities is their common focus on BODs as 
resources provider instead of monitor of firm’s management (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Regarding board size, several conflicting mixed results were 
given since the past decades. On one hand, studies of Eisenberg, Sundgren, and 
Wells(1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch(1992), 
Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012), Yermack (1996)etc. contends that smaller BS contributes 
better to the firm performance as bigger BS are usually ineffective and cumbersome to 
manage. On the other hand, majority of other prior and extant researches such as Chen 
and Al-Najjar (2012), Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand (1999), de Villiers et al., (2011), 
Guest (2008), Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Sanda, Mikailu, and Garba(2005), Uadiale 
(2010) among others asserted that larger board size relates positively to firm performance. 
This is because, bigger BS were predicted to consist many directors with different 
expertise, qualifications and business experience, external connections, reputations and 
other qualities that lead to qualitative decision making. As BS increases, the domination of 
BODs by a CEO becomes more challenging and BODs would have a good chance to 
utilize their authority in leading the firm (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Consistent with these 
prior studies, this study argues that, in a larger board, it is more likely that one or more 
BODs may have acquired skills regarding banking crisis and on how to revive the bank 
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especially after a bail-out. As such, any director having such skills/exposure can guide the 
remaining BODs regarding the related strength, weakness, challenges and opportunities 
that must be managed to succeed in their function. Thus, we form the following 
hypothesis: 
H.1: Board size is significantly related to bail-out banks performance. 
 
Female Membership in a Board (FMB) and Banks’ Performance 
To strengthen the resources provision abilities, more recent researches on CG has begun 
to refocus on proposing of gender diversity (female board membership) in top 
management positions and corporate boardrooms (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; 
Dalton et al., 1999; Farrell & Hersch, 2005). Female membership as corporate BODs is 
very minimal globally. Female corporate board membership is less than “15% in countries 
like UK, USA, Canada, Australia and many European countries, but some Asian countries 
have as low as 0.2%”(Terjesen & Singh, 2008). However, in Nigeria, no empirically data is 
reported as female representation is also less than 0.2% of Asia. Several researches have 
reported conflicting findings about the influence of female membership on board on the 
performance of firms (Carter et al., 2003; Vo & Phan, 2013). In Nigeria’s context, nothing 
is known in the case of bail-out banks hence, there is need to investigate whether the 
female members might be more ethically responsible and might be more vigorous in 
monitoring management to ensure better banks performance after the bail-out rescue. 
Therefore, the study will introduced it to the model, testing it alongside a moderator. Vo 
and Phan(2013)’s work reveals that female membership on boards signifies that board’s 
membership is actually diversified which in turn improves the firm’s performance. Several 
other views were found regarding the effect of female membership in a board. Both Carter 
et al., (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2003) found a strong relationship between the 
number of female membership on board and value of the firm using Tobin’s q. Also, the 
Norwegian study of Nielsen and Huse (2010) additionally confirmed the positive 
correlation between women directorship and firm performance using a survey 
questionnaire data administered among 120 firms in Norway. They added that women 
directors positively influence strategic decision making and monitoring. Theirresult is also 
supported by another study in Australian context by Kang, Cheng, and Gray(2007).  
 
Also in support, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), revealed a significant correlation between 
Board size and the female membership on board. Since the presence of an experienced, 
competent female director could provide more credible, unbiased advice, counsel, 
connections, and also monitoring the management’s strategy implementation to protect 
their reputation, the firm performance tend to be better (Farrell & Hersch, 2005). The study 
of Farrell and Hersch (2005) reported that females naturally tend to only serve in better 
performing firms, hence this study argues that presence of female in boards could 
probably lead to better firm performance due to her ability to deliver her advisory and 
guidance duties diligently, effectively and vigorously. Thus we form the following 
hypothesis:  






Indirect Relationship  
Board Equity Ownership (Moderator) 
Practically, the implementation of CBN code of corporate governance in Nigeria, posed 
some challenges, prominent among which were: ambiguities regarding the appointment of 
independent directors and the share ownership status of these independent directors 
(CBN, 2008). Thus, it has been an unresolved debate concerning the potential importance/ 
effect of board members’ equity ownership on both the board functional performance and 
firm performance. Albring et al., (2013), opined that in the USA, the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999), among others, suggests that director stock ownership should reduce 
agency problems and therefore the need for external monitoring. Thus, in an attempt to 
make a proper alignment of the interest of director and shareholders, many boards have 
implemented stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements for directors, leading to 
a substantial rise in the ownership of managers and directors but in Nigeria, there exist 
ambiguities and challenges regarding the directors share ownership status (CBN, 2008). 
There exist conflicting researchers’ views regarding this which until now, no clear position 
is given by the CBN. This show the real extent of the misconception on whether or not 
equity ownership by the board of Directors would influence their mandated functions. Also, 
the percentage of the shareholding is still not clearly determined. However, Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008), Bhagat, Carey, and Elson (1999), de Villiers et al.,(2011), Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003), and Zahra(1996)all agreed and suggested that Stock ownership aligns the 
interests of the directors with those of shareholders. Bhagat & Bolton, (2008)’s study  
further revealed that particularly in a poor firm performance, the likelihood of disciplinary 
management turnover (replacement) is positively correlated with stock ownership of board 
members. As such, directors with more equity ownership are likely to objectively evaluate 
firm performance and control firm choices (Patton & Baker, 1987). Similarly, 
Weisbach(1988) also reported that CEO replacement in poorly performing firms was 
greater as the representation of independent outside directors increases. Board members 
(both executive and non-executive) share ownership reduces manager/shareholder 
conflicts. To the extent that executive board members own part of the firm, they develop 
shareholder-like interests and are less likely to engage in behaviour that is detrimental to 
firms’ / shareholders interest. In support, Kren and Kerr, (1997) shows that boards with 
significant holdings are more likely to link CEO pay to firm performance and replace CEOs 
of poorly performing firms Bhagat, Carey, and Elson(1999).  
 
On the contrary view, Demsetz and Lehn(1985)) reported that BEO is not associated with 
the performance of firms and a trivial support for the discrepancy in managers and 
shareholders’ interests. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that contribution of board’s 
ownership is considered as a “two-edged knife” in which there is an optimal level of board 
ownership which contributes positively to a firm’s performance. However, the study of 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) revealed that performance of companies improves 
firstly BEO increases up to 5%, and then decreases as BEO rises up to level of  25% and 
then lastly increases again slightly at a higher BEO. McConnell and Servaes (1990) in 
their study confirmed that there exist a significant curvilinear interrelationship between 
BEO distribution and the value of a firm. Uadiale, (2010) in a Nigerian study with a sample 
of 30 listed firms reported a negative relationship between BEO and the financial 





Corporate Governance, Board Equity Ownership, and Banks Performance 
By and large, boards’ equity ownership, was viewed as an encouragement that will help 
board members advice, guide and supervise management in a more efficient way. 
Consistent with the positive view, Chung and Pruitt (1996), Jensen and Murphy(1990), 
Mehran (1995)supported that, board’s ownership will improve firm’s performance and are 
positively correlated. More related to this study, (Albring et al., 2013; Bhagat & Bolton, 
2008; Bhagat et al., 1999; de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Westphal, 1999; Zahra, 1996)show that director ownership influence or improves 
boards’ advisory, external connections, and guidance of strategic decision making. 
Similarly, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that ownership incentives motivate directors to 
forgo short- term returns for long-term projects and strategies.  
 
The study further argues consistent with many studies like Albring et al., (2013), Bhagat 
and Bolton, (2008); de Villiers et al., (2011); Guest, (2008) that, if these banks’ board of 
directors were having a substantial equity ownership in the banks or compensated with 
equity as incentives for a targeted performance, they would definitely have advised, 
monitored and counselled those sacked incompetent/fraudulent banks’ managements. In 
the current aftermath of banking crisis, it is plausible that higher ownership could motivate 
directors to provide resources (advices, counsel connections etc.) to management which 
will in-turn lead to higher firm performance in the long run. Boards’ equity ownership could 
motivate large or small sizeof a board and motivate a female board member in her 
fiduciary duty. Thus, we form the following hypotheses:  
H.3: Board equity ownership has a relationship with the bail-out banks’ 
performance. 
H.4: Board equity ownership moderates the relationship between board 
size and bail-out   banks’ performance. 
H5: Board equity ownership moderates the relationship between female 
membership in a board and bail-out banks performance. 
 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK:  
Figure 1 is the proposed study framework based on the perspective of resource provision 
roles of BODs which is covered by the resource dependence theory.  
Figure 1: Framework 
 
 H.1, H.2 
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This paper proposes a framework based on an ongoing research, to examine the influence 
of equity ownership in motivating BODs of banks and improving their functional 
effectiveness in providing advisory, guidance, and other resources to the managements’ 
overall strategic control system. This will results in a better banks performance after the 
reform. The findings of this research will provide significant contribution to the literature, 
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